United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
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- SPSelected public diplomacy award...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Selected public diplomacy awards mostly achieved objectives, but embassy can take steps to enhance grant management and oversight
no cover - ASAfghan Special Mission WingUnited States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Afghan Special Mission Wing
no cover - PMProgress made toward increased...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Progress made toward increased stability under USAID's Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East Program but transition to long term development efforts not yet achieved
no cover - IIIncreases in security costs are...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Increases in security costs are likely under the Afghan public protection force
no cover - FYFiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan in...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan infrastructure fund projects are behind schedule and lack adequate sustainment plans
no cover - UHUSAID has disbursed $9.5 billio...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
USAID has disbursed $9.5 billion for reconstruction and funded some financial audits as required, but many audits face significant delays, accountability limitations, and lack of resources
no cover - CHC-JTSCC has taken steps to impr...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
C-JTSCC has taken steps to improve the accuracy of its contract data, but it should assess the feasibility of correcting data for fiscal year 2009 and earlier
no cover - USUSAID spent almost $400 million...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
USAID spent almost $400 million on an Afghan stabilization project despite uncertain results, but has taken steps to better assess similar efforts
no cover - DIDOD improved its accountability...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
DOD improved its accountability for vehicles provided to the Afghan national security forces, but should follow up on end-use monitoring findings
no cover - AFAfghan First initiative has pla...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Afghan First initiative has placed work with Afghan companies, but is affected by inconsistent contract solicitation and vetting, and employment data is limited
no cover - CECommander's Emergency Response...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Commander's Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province provided some benefits, but oversight weaknesses and sustainment concerns led to questionable outcomes and potential waste
no cover - ANAfghanistan's National Solidari...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program has reached thousands of Afghan communities, but faces challenges that could limit outcomes
no cover - ANAfghan National Security Univer...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Afghan National Security University has experienced cost growth and schedule delays, and contract administration needs improvement
no cover - BPBetter planning and oversight c...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Better planning and oversight could have reduced construction delays and costs at the Kabul Military Training Center
no cover - ANActions needed to better assess...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Actions needed to better assess and coordinate capacity-building efforts at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
no cover - TUThe U.S. civilian uplift in Afg...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
The U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan has cost nearly $2 billion, and state should continue to strengthen Its management and oversight of the funds transferred to other agencies
no cover - TWThe World Bank and the Afghan g...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
The World Bank and the Afghan government have established mechanisms to monitor and account for funds contributed to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but some limitations and challenges should be addressed
no cover - LILimited interagency coordinatio...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Limited interagency coordination and insufficient controls over U.S. funds in Afghanistan hamper U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan financial sector and safeguard U.S. cash
no cover - UAU.S. agencies have provided tra...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
U.S. agencies have provided training and support to Afghanistan's major crimes task force, but reporting and reimbursement issues need to be addressed
no cover - UKUSAID's Kabul community develop...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
USAID's Kabul community development program largely met the agreement's terms, but progress toward long-term goals needs to be better tracked
no cover - DIDespite improvements in MoI's p...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Despite improvements in MoI's personnel systems additional actions are needed to completely verify ANP payroll costs and workforce strength
no cover - AFANA facilities at Mazar-e-Shari...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
ANA facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat generally met construction requirements, but contractor oversight should be strengthened
no cover - WIWeaknesses in reporting and coo...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Weaknesses in reporting and coordination of development assistance and lack of provincial capacity pose risks to U.S. strategy in Nangarhar Province
no cover - UCU.S. civilian uplift in Afghani...United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan is progressing but some key issues merit further examination as implementation continues
no cover
Works in catalog
Quick navigation into the work-level grouping pages behind the featured books.
- Open Work
Selected public diplomacy awards mostly achieved objectives, but embassy can take steps to enhance grant management and oversight
- Open Work
Afghan Special Mission Wing
- Open Work
Progress made toward increased stability under USAID's Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East Program but transition to long term development efforts not yet achieved
- Open Work
Increases in security costs are likely under the Afghan public protection force
- Open Work
Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan infrastructure fund projects are behind schedule and lack adequate sustainment plans
- Open Work
USAID has disbursed $9.5 billion for reconstruction and funded some financial audits as required, but many audits face significant delays, accountability limitations, and lack of resources
- Open Work
C-JTSCC has taken steps to improve the accuracy of its contract data, but it should assess the feasibility of correcting data for fiscal year 2009 and earlier
- Open Work
USAID spent almost $400 million on an Afghan stabilization project despite uncertain results, but has taken steps to better assess similar efforts
- Open Work
DOD improved its accountability for vehicles provided to the Afghan national security forces, but should follow up on end-use monitoring findings
- Open Work
Afghan First initiative has placed work with Afghan companies, but is affected by inconsistent contract solicitation and vetting, and employment data is limited
- Open Work
Commander's Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province provided some benefits, but oversight weaknesses and sustainment concerns led to questionable outcomes and potential waste
- Open Work
Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program has reached thousands of Afghan communities, but faces challenges that could limit outcomes
- Open Work
Afghan National Security University has experienced cost growth and schedule delays, and contract administration needs improvement
- Open Work
Better planning and oversight could have reduced construction delays and costs at the Kabul Military Training Center
- Open Work
Actions needed to better assess and coordinate capacity-building efforts at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
- Open Work
The U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan has cost nearly $2 billion, and state should continue to strengthen Its management and oversight of the funds transferred to other agencies
- Open Work
The World Bank and the Afghan government have established mechanisms to monitor and account for funds contributed to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, but some limitations and challenges should be addressed
- Open Work
Limited interagency coordination and insufficient controls over U.S. funds in Afghanistan hamper U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan financial sector and safeguard U.S. cash
- Open Work
U.S. agencies have provided training and support to Afghanistan's major crimes task force, but reporting and reimbursement issues need to be addressed
- Open Work
USAID's Kabul community development program largely met the agreement's terms, but progress toward long-term goals needs to be better tracked
- Open Work
Despite improvements in MoI's personnel systems additional actions are needed to completely verify ANP payroll costs and workforce strength
- Open Work
ANA facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat generally met construction requirements, but contractor oversight should be strengthened
- Open Work
Weaknesses in reporting and coordination of development assistance and lack of provincial capacity pose risks to U.S. strategy in Nangarhar Province
- Open Work
U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan is progressing but some key issues merit further examination as implementation continues