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Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg

DF
24 featured booksDrew Fudenberg

Professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

OL399370A

Overview

Catalog identity and bibliographic footprint for this author.

24 representative editions

Author pages in Bookitis are intended to show only works actually attributed to the author and a representative edition for each of those works.

Catalog identity

How this author appears inside the active Bookitis catalog.

  • Display name

    Drew Fudenberg

  • Personal name

    Drew Fudenberg

  • Source identifier

    OL399370A

Featured books

Representative editions for works actually authored by this person.

Works in catalog

Quick navigation into the work-level grouping pages behind the featured books.

  • game theory

    Representative edition published 2019

    Open Work
  • A long-run collaboration on long-run games

    Representative edition published 2009

    Open Work
  • Bo yi lun

    Representative edition published 2002

    Open Work
  • Dynamic Models of Oligopoly

    Representative edition published 2002

    Open Work
  • Dynamic models of oligopoly

    Representative edition published 2001

    Open Work
  • The theory of learning in games

    Representative edition published 1998

    Open Work
  • Game Theory

    Representative edition published 1993

    Open Work
  • Learning mixed equilibria

    Representative edition published 1992

    Open Work
  • Self-confirming equilibrium

    Representative edition published 1991

    Open Work
  • Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium

    Representative edition published 1991

    Open Work
  • Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed

    Representative edition published 1991

    Open Work
  • Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players

    Representative edition published 1991

    Open Work
  • Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games

    Representative edition published 1991

    Open Work
  • Monopoly and credibility in asset markets

    Representative edition published 1989

    Open Work
  • An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information

    Representative edition published 1989

    Open Work
  • Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information

    Representative edition published 1989

    Open Work
  • The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information

    Representative edition published 1989

    Open Work
  • Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales

    Representative edition published 1988

    Open Work
  • Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games

    Representative edition published 1988

    Open Work
  • Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria

    Representative edition published 1988

    Open Work
  • Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts

    Representative edition published 1988

    Open Work
  • Repeated games with long-run and short-run players

    Representative edition published 1988

    Open Work
  • Finite player approximations to a continuum of players

    Representative edition published 1987

    Open Work
  • On the robustness of equilibrium refinements

    Representative edition published 1987

    Open Work