Drew Fudenberg
Drew Fudenberg
Professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Featured books
Representative editions for works actually authored by this person.
- Image source: Open LibraryGT
game theory
cover - Image source: Open LibraryAL
A long-run collaboration on long-run games
cover - Image source: Open LibraryBY
Bo yi lun
cover - Image source: Open LibraryDM
Dynamic Models of Oligopoly
cover - Image source: Open LibraryDM
Dynamic models of oligopoly
cover - Image source: Open LibraryTT
The theory of learning in games
cover - Image source: Open LibraryGT
Game Theory
cover - Image source: Open LibraryLM
Learning mixed equilibria
cover - Image source: Open LibrarySE
Self-confirming equilibrium
cover - Image source: Open LibrarySS
Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium
cover - Image source: Open LibraryMA
Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
cover - Image source: Open LibraryEA
Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
cover - Image source: Open LibraryEC
Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games
cover - Image source: Open LibraryMA
Monopoly and credibility in asset markets
cover - Image source: Open LibraryAA
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
cover - Image source: Open LibraryEP
Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information
cover - Image source: Open LibraryTF
The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information
cover - Image source: Open LibraryRU
Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales
cover - Image source: Open LibraryNA
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
cover - Image source: Open LibraryPB
Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria
cover - Image source: Open LibraryMH
Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts
cover - Image source: Open LibraryRG
Repeated games with long-run and short-run players
cover - Image source: Open LibraryFP
Finite player approximations to a continuum of players
cover - Image source: Open LibraryOT
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
cover
Works in catalog
Quick navigation into the work-level grouping pages behind the featured books.
- Open Work
game theory
- Open Work
A long-run collaboration on long-run games
- Open Work
Bo yi lun
- Open Work
Dynamic Models of Oligopoly
- Open Work
Dynamic models of oligopoly
- Open Work
The theory of learning in games
- Open Work
Game Theory
- Open Work
Learning mixed equilibria
- Open Work
Self-confirming equilibrium
- Open Work
Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium
- Open Work
Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed
- Open Work
Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Open Work
Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games
- Open Work
Monopoly and credibility in asset markets
- Open Work
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
- Open Work
Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public information
- Open Work
The Folk Theorem with imperfect public information
- Open Work
Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingales
- Open Work
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- Open Work
Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria
- Open Work
Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contracts
- Open Work
Repeated games with long-run and short-run players
- Open Work
Finite player approximations to a continuum of players
- Open Work
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements