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Yonca Ertimur
We document the frequency of implementation of non-binding, majority-vote (MV) shareholder proposals and analyze the determinants and consequences of Boards' decisions to implement them. Using a sample of 620 shareholder proposals that received a MV between 1997 and 2004, we find that the frequency of implementation has almost doubled from 22% between 1997 and 2002 to 41% in 2003-2004. With respect to the determinants of the implementation decision, we find a positive relation between shareholder pressure and the likelihood of implementation, while traditional governance indicators do not seem to play a key role.
| Edition | Rev. |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Harvard Business School |
| Pages | 61 |
| Search language | english |
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