If a country's accounting standards represent a political-economic equilibrium, why is that equilibrium for some countries shifting over time in favor of IFRS? We develop and test the hypothesis that network effects from the extant worldwide adoption of IFRS explain a country's shift away from local accounting standards. That is, as more jurisdictions with economic ties to a given country adopt IFRS, perceived benefits from lowering transactions costs to foreign financial-statement users come to outweigh institutional differences (e.g., auditing technology) that make IFRS adoption costly. If true, the implication is that worldwide IFRS adoption is self-perpetuating. We find that perceived network benefits increase the degree of IFRS harmonization, although larger countries and countries less dependent on foreign trade have a differentially lower response to the IFRS network value. Also, benefits expected to accrue due to economic relations with the EU are a significant component of the perceived network value.

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