This book describes, for the first time, allied contingency plans for military operations in the Middle East, in the event of a global conflict with the Soviet Union. It argues that the diplomatic events and crises in the Middle East during the first decade after World War Two can be understood only in the context of the military and strategic assets sought by the allies in that region, in view of the perceived Soviet threat. Professor Cohen synthesises military and diplomatic thought during the crucial decade after World War Two and thus brings a new, comprehensive understanding of the major events of this decade; the Truman Doctrine; the protracted Anglo-Egyptian crisis; the first Arab-Israeli war; the Tripartite Declaration; and the formation of the Baghdad Pact. This valuable study places events in the Middle East within the wider context of the global geo-strategic balance, and the decline of British power. It records also the reluctance of the United States to do what eventually became inevitable - to take over Britain's traditional hegemony in the near and Middle East.