"It is essential for anyone involved in law, politics, and government to comprehend the workings of the federal independent regulatory agencies of the United States. Occasionally referred to as the 'headless fourth branch of government,' these agencies do not fit neatly within any of the three constitutional branches. Their members are appointed for terms that typically exceed those of the president and cannot be removed from office in the absence of some sort of malfeasance or misconduct. They wield enormous power over the private sector. This book provides a full-length study of the structure and workings of federal independent regulatory agencies in the United States, focusing on traditional multimember agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. It recognizes that the changing kaleidoscope of modern life has led Congress to create innovative and idiosyncratic administrative structures including government corporations, government-sponsored enterprises governance, public-private partnerships, systems for 'contracting out,' self-regulation, and incorporation by reference of private standards. In the process, Breger and Edles analyze the general conflict between political accountability and agency independence. They provide a unique comparative review of the internal operations of US agencies and offer contrasts among US, EU, and certain UK independent agencies. Included is a unique appendix describing the powers and procedures of the more than thirty-five independent US federal agencies, each supplemented by a selective bibliography"--Unedited summary from book jacket.