Over the past twenty-five years, theorists have proposed over two dozen different sets of solutions to the Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma game. The book employs a fourfold typology of market, community, contract, and hierarchy to sort these solutions and investigate whether they actually produce cooperation. Further, it uses two analytical standards for evaluating proposed solutions: a solution must be complete in that it alone turns inaction to action and consistent in that it develops out of the pecuniary self-interest kernel of the program. It turns out that these standards are in conflict: if we try to make collective action theories logically complete, they become logically inconsistent; if we try to make them consistent, they become incomplete. Professor Lichbach demonstrates how this trade-off forces us to delimit the scope and boundaries of collective action theories and to appreciate how they might be combined with culturalist and institutionalist approaches. The Cooperator's Dilemma provides a remarkably up-to-date and comprehensive statement and assessment of collective action thinking. It will be important reading for the diverse and growing audience of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists who are interested in collective action and Public Goods-Prisoner's Dilemma issues and research.