In the six years since President Reagan announced his plan for a "Strategic Defense Initiative", it has become the centerpiece of American military policy. Yet has our nuclear strategy really changed? Janne Nolan argues that it has not, and that despite the efforts of virtually every president in the nuclear era to alter the policies of his predecessors, these initiatives have had little impact on the real decisions being taken by the closely knit cadre of individuals responsible for operational war planning. This book traces the erratic evolution of our declaratory nuclear doctrine, from Truman's "NSC-68" to Eisenhower's "massive retaliation", Kennedy's "mutual assured destruction", Nixon's "flexible counterforce", and Carter's "countervailing strategy". It also examines why, regardless of which administration is in power, these good intentions have been circumvented by vested interests intent on maximizing our technological superiority. Nolan contends that we risk losing control of our nuclear juggernaut unless our presidents are able to bridge the gap between public rhetoric and military reality.