"Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind - consciousness, intentionality, normativity - that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This "explanatory gap" between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent discussions in philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding." "In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science."--BOOK JACKET.