In this original new study of one of the most bizarre episodes of the late 20th century, the author weaves an intricate pattern and builds a powerful framework to explain the causes of the Gulf war. Firstly, he shows how Saddam Hussein's personality and upbringing includes many of the features which psychologists have detected in the personal backgrounds of other prominent dictators who have launched wars. Secondly, his analysis of the distinctive internal weaknesses of the Iraqi state - sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shi'ites, ethnic conflict between Arabs and Kurds, economic weakness following the debilitating Iran-Iraq war, all presided over by the impotence of political institutions born of a repressive state machine - shows how the country's political elite resorted to scapegoating and thus a belligerent foreign policy. And finally the author assesses the formal anarchy of the post Cold War international system as it affected the Gulf region and demonstrates how the vacuum in the regional balance of power led Iraq to miscalculate the odds on a successful Western counter-attack against Iraq.