Join BookitisSave favorites, build lists, and follow creators.

Corruption under moral hazard

Work detail

Bookitis Pick
Corruption under moral hazard
CU
Gunnar S. EskelandFirst published 19991 editions

Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits.

Overview

Shared work-level identity and catalog context.

First publish date 19991 credited authorSearch language english

Bookitis keeps work pages focused on the shared book identity and the editions that actually belong to it. Unrelated books should not appear here as primary content.

Contributors

People credited with this work in the active catalog.

  • Gunnar S. Eskeland

    Author profile in the active Bookitis catalog

    Open Author

Editions

Publication-specific versions linked to this work only.