This book describes how, in the 1950s, South Africa tried to embroil Africa's colonial powers in an alliance against black nationalism, an alliance in the style of NATO and associated with it. It describes how - largely because of the contempt of British military planners for South African strategy, widespread suspicion of South Africa's intentions in the north, and fear of the consequences of being too closely identified with apartheid - Pretoria had to settle instead for an entente, and an entente, moreover, with its nose pointed at the Middle East. The book describes the elements of this entente, especially the Nairobi-Dakar system, and the multilateral 'Sea Routes' planning which was conducted at the instigation of Defence Minister Erasmus following the conclusion of the Simonstown Agreements in 1955. Finally, it describes how the entente virtually disappeared under the impact of African decolonization and the revolution in British military policy concluded by the Sandys White Paper of 1957. Generally, the book considers the argument that ententes have the advantages of alliances without their disadvantages, and suggests that this is exaggerated.