Review Written By Bernie Weisz, Historian & Book Reviewer, Vietnam War Pembroke Pines, Florida USA Contact: BernWei1@aol.com Title of REVIEW "A South Vietnamese Fighter Pilots' Memoir: Just Walk a Mile in my Shoes Before you Abuse, Criticize and Accuse! AUTHOR: Hoi B. Tran December 10, 2011 Terms like the "Dien Bien Phu, South Vietnamese Air Force, Vietnamization and Reeducation Camps for the most part mean nothing to the average American Vietnam Veteran. However, they mean everything to an individual who was born in Hanoi, Vietnam and came of age after the end of W.W. II. This would be a person who would witness French Colonial rule end, welcome a man named Ho Chi Minh until shown his criminalizing, brutal version of Communism. He would learn about General Giap's victory at Dien Bien Phu. Based on what was resolved in Geneva, Switzerland, a decision would have to be made as to whether he would live North or South of a geographic parallel that would split ideologies and families into two separate countries. This person would know what the South Vietnamese Air Force would be as he would go South and be a member of it. He would watch the Soviets and Chinese fund and supply his Northern Vietnamese nemesis from the sidelines while the Americans would back his Southern brethren with a fighting presence. The Americans would come, fight and die and eventually leave. Between the American press incorrectly interpreting the Tet Offensive, 58,000 plus casualties and a promise to back the South no matter what made by a U.S. president that would resign within a year, the Northern Communists would prevail in 1975. Once again a decision similar to 1954 had to be made; between accepting a brutal regime and incarceration in a Communist "Reeducation Camp" or freedom 10,000 miles away in America. The spectator of these events would choose the latter. His name is Hoi B. Tran and he is the author of "A Vietnamese Fighter Pilot in an American War." The importance of this book is not to publish a lackluster historical recitation of Southeast Asian history with the author's life serving as a reference point. Instead it details the ordeal Tran faced as an individual who was born in a colonial society that ultimately lapsed into dictatorial communism. A valiant twenty one year fight to preserve democracy was made but ultimately the author was forced to flee South Vietnam fearing retribution from the impending Communist takeover. Nevertheless, this book reveals much more; the author conveys to readers his strong belief in filial commitment by virtue of taking his wife and three children as political refugees to the United States. Once in America, Tran proves that anyone can start over at any age and with perseverance and determination succeed. He quickly secured housing, transportation and gainful employment to provide for his family and become an asset to this country. Never again reentering the field of aviation despite an offer, the author had two successful careers; a four year stint as a state employee and twenty four year run as a claims adjuster. This is Hoi Tran's recapitulation of his life; the Vietnam War as he saw it, contributing to fight Communism as a fighter pilot in the South Vietnamese Air Force as well as a commercial airline pilot for Air Viet Nam. Being a participant of all of the aforementioned and coming out unscathed is one thing, writing a book about it in a second language with energetic vigor is another. In both cases, Mr. Tran excelled with flying colors. A multitude of rare lessons are learned by Americans from this memoir, among them the desperation and fear the South Vietnamese perceived should they lose the war. Other issues are their great disappointment from the results of the Paris Peace talks as well as what the American media did to influence American politicians as well as the course of the war. The author's personal reaction to President Nixon's "Vietnamization" was that he knew in his heart what the inevitable outcome of this war would be as a consequence. Also revealed is the deceiving, barbarous brand of Communistic treachery Ho Chi Minh and his band of miscreant flunkeys perpetuated on Vietnam that is guaranteed to make the most stoic reader cringe. Exposed within this memoir is the sheer, inhumane terror an inmate of the "Reeducation Camps" experienced, as well as the brutal conditions that existed for South Vietnamese citizens after the Fall of Saigon. The reader of this book will approach all future American Vietnam War memoirs with a different perspective, knowing that much of the anti South Vietnamese rhetoric that exists is based on ethnocentric prejudice, half truths or ignorance, rather than fact. There is a poignant "Advance Praise" written by Vietnam Veteran and author Phil Jennings within this memoir, asserting the following: "People like Major Tran are why America went to South Vietnam's aid, and why we should have stayed the course to their ultimate victory." Upon conclusion, the reader of this book will readily comprehend this statement. The numbers of people that were affected by the Vietnam War is staggering. The blame for the origins of this strife according to the author is singular: Ho Chi Minh. In a scathing diatribe, Tran labels the former Northern dictator as a dishonest, unprincipled mass murderer and a con artist of the worst kind who in the guise of Communism turned Vietnam into a country of abject suffering as well as one of the poorest nations on earth. From 1945 and the period ending with W.W. II to the climatic confrontation of the first Indochina War at Dien Bien Phu, close to 200,000 people were murdered at the direction of Ho Chi Minh. Tran explains that in the guise of Communistic redistribution of wealth, Ho's "Land Reform Campaign" abolished private land ownership. According to his "people's tribunals" of 1953-1956, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese land owners were accused and unjustly found guilty of being "evil landlords" in kangaroo courts. In the guise of Communist redistribution, these innocents were robbed of their legally acquired property and summarily executed in a genocidal massacre. The author's father would indirectly fall prey to this holocaust. Because of Ho Chi Minh's bellicosity, casualties and war would follow, at an even higher human toll. In the upcoming bloodshed starting with the first "Indochina War" against the French, followed by the Vietnam War (called the "American War" by the Ho's lackeys) approximately 1.1 million North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers were killed, 58, 178 Americans and 250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers lost their lives. In addition, an estimated 2,000,000 civilians on both sides perished from warfare, as well as 200,000 people after the 1975 fall of Saigon in the punitive, retaliatory "Reeducation Camps." The lethal aftereffects of Communism swallowing up the South resulted in 500,000 freedom seeking "Boat People" perishing out at sea, 100,000 South Vietnamese executed for various offenses, another 95,000 succumbed in Communist Death Camps, and 50,000 were liquidated in Ho's "Forced Labor" camps. Sadly, one of the casualties amongst the Boat People was the author's best friend. Another shameful consequence both Indochina wars, albeit not mentioned in this memoir, is those still missing in action. In his book "Unwanted Dead or Alive," Robert Pelton supported Hoi Tran’s memoir by confirming the shiftiness of the Communists. Pelton stated in regard to the disposition of French POW's following Dien Bien Phu; "The defeat of the French Army at Dien Bien Phu came on May 7th, 1954 after a 56 day siege. General de Castries and 16,000 of his men surrendered. They were marched off to brutal POW camps and abandoned by their government. When the French Forces surrendered to the Viet Minh, French troops included French regulars, Foreign Legionnaires, as well as colonial troops from North Africa that were taken prisoner by the Viet Minh. Only a very small number were able to escape after the siege, with 78 recorded as having successfully making it back to French custody by traveling onwards to Laos. " During the entire war, 39,000 French Force POW's were taken by the Viet Minh, with approximately 11,000 returned during repatriations." Where are the rest of these men? Pelton also wrote; "Robert Garwood, the U.S. POW who returned from North Vietnam in 1979 stated that during the mid 1970's he saw French prisoners being used as forced laborers in a North Vietnamese dairy farm not far from Hanoi." Going back to Dien Bien Phu, 8,280 French POW's died while in Viet Minh custody. Pelton adds: None of France's war dead from Dien Bien Phu or other battle sites in North Vietnam, and none of its war dead from Viet Minh prison camps or military hospitals were repatriated." Another issue America sought to disengage from the Viet Nam war was over its POW's. A major issue of contention at the Paris Peace Talks, aside from the absurd distraction of the shape of the table as well as the North insisting the National Liberation Front was a legitimate self entity in the South, was the return of captured American POW's. After President Johnson refused to run for reelection because of Walter Cronkite's inaccurate interpretation of the January, 1968 Tet Offensive portrayed falsely as a defeat, Nixon ran under his pledge of bringing an end to American involvement under the slogan "peace and honor," as well as the revelation of a "secret plan" to end the war. This revelation turned out to be his infamous "Vietnamization," a catch all term for turning the war over to the South Vietnamese, giving them massive equipment, training, funding, while simultaneously extracting all American troops." At this time, Tran was now flying a 727 commercially for "Air Viet Nam." He was the actual pilot that transported Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky from South Vietnam to Paris and back. The final treaty ending American involvement in Vietnam occurred in late January, 1973. Under the terms of the accord, North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Le Duc Tho and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, along with South Vietnamese President Thieu who Hoi Tran explains how he was browbeaten into signing, U.S. military forces withdrew from South Vietnam and prisoners were exchanged. In Febuary of 1973 "Operation Homecoming," the repatriation of POW's took place. A total of 591 POW's were returned. However, Hoi Tran nor any of his countrymen were celebrating. With deep consternation, the author lamented;"While America was celebrating the homecoming of American POW's and the end of U.S. involvement in the Viet Nam conflict, in the RVN nationalist Vietnamese began to worry for their families, their lives and their future. Those of us Northerners who had fled our birthplace right after our country was divided in 1954 were even more worried because we knew the Communists too well." He had reason to worry, as author Robert Pelton commented about Hanoi's treachery in releasing the POW's; "The 591 figure represented a miniscule 12% the figure of 5,000 POW's held by the North Vietnamese as reported in the N.Y. Times. The number of POW's the U.S. Government demanded from the North Vietnamese-5000, correlates with the statement of a former employee of the National Security Agency. He gave a sworn affidavit that the North Vietnamese repatriated only 15%. In other words, according to this source, the North Vietnamese kept 85% of American POW's who were still alive after March 28, 1973. The U.S. Government officially acknowledged some 2,500 Americans lost in action, another 2,000 lost on covert "black" operations in Thailand, China, Cambodia , Burma, etc/ This is a total of at least 5,000 MIA's between the ages of 18 to 30. None of these 2,500 men were ever officially counted as MIA's, Why? Because as silly as it may seem America's leaders couldn't bring themselves to publically admit the U.S. had men in areas they weren't supposed to be in. Not one U.S. president-J.F.K, L.B.J., Nixon, Ford, Carter, Bush or Clinton made any substantive effort to solve the missing POW problem. Only once did an offer surface a few weeks after Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. Word was received that the Vietnamese wanted to sell all the remaining POW's for 4 billion dollars. The number of POW's wasn’t specified. The President's staff advised him against taking this offer. Their absurd excuse? They said that buying U.S. POW's would make it appear that the U.S. was being blackmailed." As the reader of this amazing memoir will discover, Mr. Tran gives concrete examples of why feared the Communists from the North. As the aforementioned example lends testimony, the author refers to the current rulers as "Red Capitalists," citing the current epidemic of prostitution, drugs and exportation of women to neighboring countries as "sex slaves." Returning twice to his homeland to visit his family, Mr. Tran made this startling observation; "Never in the former Republic of Viet Nam did I see politicians and high ranking generals have multimillion dollar mansions or vacation houses like today's Red Capitalists. Mr. Tran, upon seeing children of high ranking NVA generals driving Rolls Royces, Ferrari's and Maserati's wonders why the U.S. press, the same people that told such distortions during the war to alter public opinion doesn't say anything now; "Why don't they come out to criticize the current cruel Communist dictators, the corrupt and immoral red Capitalists like they did during the Ngo Dinh Diem or Nguyen Van Thieu government?" It seems fitting that integrity is an important attribute to the author; "Hoi" means "boar" in Chinese, and people born in 1935, the year of the Boar, tend to be brave, giving, unpretentious, are incredibly enduring and especially trustworthy. And when it comes to Mr. Tran’s trustworthiness, he passionately warns all about the veracity of the North Vietnamese Communists; "Never trust them! They have been proven to be the worst kind evildoers through the last half of the twentieth century to present. They have transformed themselves from poor peasants before April 1975 to millionaires and billionaires through plundering and stealing after 1975. In the bottom of their souls, they are still the inhumane, immoral, deceptive , cruel, dangerous, traitorous and unpredictable communists. Do ever not trust them regardless of how sweet or conciliatory they may sound! The aforementioned explains why Hoi Tran made his decision in 1954 to go South rather than live under Ho's Communism. Specifically because of Communistic actions, Mr. Tran would be involved in a two decade long proxy war subsidized by some heavy hitters; the North by the Soviet Union and Communist China, the South by the U.S. The stakes were heavy: if Ho's henchmen were victorious, unless you were an insider within the Communist gang's elite you'd live like a slave regardless of your address. If the South was vanquished, unless one fled the continent altogether it would result in "hell on earth" for any Vietnamese family. This would loom large, especially if a family member was associated in any way with the former regimes of Bao Dai, Ngo Dinh Diem, Nguyen Van Thieu, et. al. The political factionalism that ultimately lead to intense bloodshed, carnage and armed conflict was not a phenomenon solely facing Vietnam's inhabitants. The identical anxiety and dilemmas faced by the Tran clan would be geographically contagious, manifesting itself in neighboring Laos and Cambodia, equally traumatizing to all. The exception would be Pol Pot's Cambodia, changed after 1975 to Kampuchia. Horrified, the international community observed Pot's deranged fanaticism of Communism taken to another level. Taking his cue from Ho's death squads, Pot conducted a genocidal policy that ruthlessly killed over two and a half million Cambodians. Making a mockery of human rights, all private property was confiscated, religions, banking, finance and currency all were abolished. Similar to the burgeoning Vietnamese "Reeducation Camps," Pot attempted to create a purely agrarian society by forcing mass relocation of all inhabitants from urban areas to collective farms. All of Kampuchia's intellectual elite were murdered, thereby eliminating anyone he considered a capitalist or hypothetically capable of undermining him. Certainly a frightening possibility that South Vietnam's new masters could emulate Kampuchia's unfolding holocaust, Hoi Tran and his family faced a frightening future if he stayed there. Few Americans, particularly the 3,403,000 that served "In Country" from 1945 until the fall of Saigon had any cognizance of the aforementioned concerns the average South Vietnamese citizen or soldier faced. Mr.Tran clues the reader in to those nuances, countering the myriad of misconceptions, skewed philosophies and omnipresent biases endemic to most Vietnam War veterans as well as the literature they produce. There are but a few scant memoirs authored by former South Vietnamese military personnel, nonetheless that possess the equivalent degree of skillful articulation Mr. Tran demonstrates with this book. In all likelihood few American soldiers that entered a South Vietnamese village while executing a "search and destroy" mission realized that similar to the American Civil War of 1861 to 1865, the Vietnamese families were equally torn apart. With forced Viet Cong recruitment, brothers fought brothers in a nasty conflict involving the entire population. Another analogy Tran intelligently identified was that Ho Chi Minh was given a free hand by his Communist masters of Red China and the Soviet Union to conquer and subjugate the South without their interference or direction. In contrast, South Viet Nam defended itself from Communist encroachment by fighting side by side in a subservient role with their American, and to a lesser degree, Australian, New Zealand and South Korean counterparts in a strange alliance that could have won all the marbles if the variables were tweaked. That is one of the reasons why Tran mentions that Ho Chi Minh viewed this free world alliance as a "paper tiger." This is illustrated by quoting one of Ho's highly indicative comments, made in 1945 as he prepared to wage guerrilla warfare against French imperialism; "They will kill many of us, and we will kill a few of them. They will grow tired." Author Hoi B. Tran gives readers a rare glimpse into this carnage, and uses his second language of English to give Americans an introspective examination of the often misunderstood mind set of a democratically inspired Vietnamese patriot. Another reason American troops had no empathy for the South Vietnamese plight was due to the fact that the majority of U.S. troops had no idea why the South was fighting the North. Sure, they "answered the nation's call" to arms and most U.S. citizens responded patriotically, voluntarily enlisting. However, few knew the inner political dynamics of Southeast Asia aside from a rudimentary understanding of the "Domino theory." The author explains that for one thousand years, Vietnam was under Chinese Domination. The area became a French Colony in 1885, dubbed "French Indochina" by its imperial masters. In May of 1940, France was overrun by Nazi Germany, and was incorporated into Adolf Hitler's "Third Reich" as "Vichey France." During World War II, the colony was administered by Vichy France while under Japanese occupation. Beginning in May 1941, the Viet Minh, a Communist army led by Ho Chi Minh, began a revolt against French rule known as the First Indochina War. Hoi Tran was born in Hanoi, and at age seven watched American fighters that were escorting bombers engage Japanese Zeros in spectacular dogfights. He credited this with creating the desire to eventually become a fighter pilot, a dream he would eventually accomplish. In his memoir, he explained a Vietnamese sentiment most American soldiers were ignorant of; "The hatred of foreign domination and brutal colonial rule, coupled with aspiration for freedom and independence for Viet Nam germinated a fanatically powerful patriotic sentiment among almost all Vietnamese. On March 9th, 1945, Japan launched a country wide coup de etat, terminating their Vietnamese Colonial rule. Japan granted Vietnam its independence within its Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere with Emperor Bao Dai as its leader. Enter the main culprit of this memoir, Ho Chi Minh. Born in 1890 in Vietnam, he lived all over the world. According to William Duiker in his book "Ho Chi Minh; A Life," Ho came to the U.S on a ship as a cook's helper. He then went on to England and later France. From 1919-1923, while living in France, Minh embraced communism, and at the Versailles peace talks concluding W.W. I he petitioned the Western powers for recognition of Vietnamese civil rights in his homeland, but was unrecognized. He then petitioned U.S. President Woodrow Wilson for aid in removing the French from Vietnam, using the American Declaration of Independence from Great Britain as an example of his ideals but once again was rebuffed. He then turned to the only other major power existing, the Soviet Union. Relocating in the Soviet Union in 1923, he studied and embraced Communism. He bounced around the world, where in 1931 he was arrested in Hong Kong and incarcerated. According to Duiker, Ho returned to Vietnam in 1941 to take the reigns of the Viet Minh, a Communist Vietnamese independence movement. During the Japanese occupation, Ho led guerrilla raids against both the Vichy French and Japanese, secretly being funded by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner to what is now the C.I.A. The Chinese Civil war had been raging since 1927, and Ho went there to help out Mao ZeDung. Caught by Chiang Kai-shek's henchmen, Ho was imprisoned for a second time. Rescued by Chinese Communists, he returned to Viet Nam for good in 1943. Two big radioactive bangs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th of 1945 ended Japanese involvement and hence, W.W. II. The article of surrender was inked on August 9th, and immediately following this, Vietnamese demonstrations and uprisings against French colonial rule broke out throughout Vietnam. To antagonize the French, Japanese forces still stationed in Indochina turned a blind eye to this and allowed groups demanding independence to commandeer public buildings throughout Vietnam. While the Japanese allowed these nationalist groups to roam unrestrained, thus keeping former French officials under captivity, Ho Chi Minh made his move. According to Hoi Tran, on August 18th, Ho's armed propaganda group covertly entered Hanoi poised to seize power the next day, which would come to be known as the "August Revolution." Throngs of patriotic Vietnamese gathered at Ha Noi's municipal theater for a ceremony that would see Ho Chi Minh installed as Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Interestingly enough, the author would be one of them. Tran was a ten year old member of the "Bach Mai Vanguard Youth Group. Ironically, on August 19th, Tran sang "Who loves Uncle Ho Chi Minh more than us children" while the group waved small versions of the official flag of the newly created "Democratic Republic of Vietnam." By the conclusion of that day, his oppressive forces seized complete control of Hanoi, and forty eight hours later, Bao Dai abdicated. Tran wrote that despite other nationalistic leaders knowing Ho's narcissistic personality and complete disregard for democratic principles, when presented with a choice between him and French colonial rule, he was seen as the lesser of the two evils. Ho soon after ordered Viet Minh death squads to aggressively murder any of his opponents. Remembering his arrest and subsequent incarceration by Chinese nationalist authorities, Ho was very nervous when Chaing Kai Shek sent General Lu Han to North Viet Nam to disarm the Japanese. General Han was sympathetic to a rival competing nationalist party, the Viet Quoc. Tran was in Ha Noi and notes in his memoir that Lu Han and his men were vicious criminals, despised intensely by all Vietnamese. Ho showed a pattern of unpredictable deceit he would exhibit the rest of his life. Uncle Ho organized "Gold Week," collecting gold from all citizens under the false pretense that it would buy weapons for Vietnam's defense, and then turned around and gave it to the General as a bribe, buying Lu Han's loyalty. Then, in one of his greatest acts of treachery, he invited the French back, signing an agreement that would allow 25,000 French troops to return to Vietnam for five years. Considered by most as a complete sell out, this deal would break down, and consequently Ho and his band would resume guerrilla operations against the French. Explaining his rationale, Ho remarked: "The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years. The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. As for me, I prefer to sniff French feces for five years than to eat Chinese feces for the rest of my life." It would take the defeat at Dien Bien Phu to finally rid Vietnam once and for all of the French. After his father indirectly passed away as a result of Ho's guerrillas waging destructive warfare, Tran vindictively enlisted with the Vietnamese Air Force when he matured, then was assigned to a French subdivision as a mechanic. In 1954 French attempts to maintain their colonial hold evaporated, and Tran decided to flee South. On May 7, 1954, under Chinese tutelidge General Vo Nguyen Giap's forces besieged and ultimately overran a trapped French Expeditionary Force garrisoned at Dien Bien Phu, nestled within the mountainous hills of Northwest Vietnam. Consequently, the world community attempted to restore peace in Indochina by convening in Geneva Switzerland. An agreement was struck whereby Vietnam was temporarily divided into two zones, a Communist ruled northern one under Ho, and a southern zone to be governed former emperor Bao Dai. General elections, supervised by an International Control Commission that later proved to be impotent, were to be held by July, 1956. to create a unified Vietnamese state. This election never occurred, with intense mutual Northern and Southern distrust of each other. The Communists in the North viewed the South Vietnamese as a former French colonial puppet regime now supplanted by America. Southerners viewed the North Vietnamese regime as totalitarian and oppressive, devoid of human rights, free speech, and therefore free elections could ever occur. Consequently, a large migration of 450,000 North Vietnamese, Hoi Tran included, moved South. The U.S. replaced the French as a Southern backer, ever fearful of the Cold War's "Domino Theory," and Ngo Dinh Diem replaced Emperor Bao Dai. Ho sent Communist agitators and spies southward among the migration, later to conduct guerrilla activity under the name of the "National Liberation Front" or Viet Cong, and the Vietnam War, or Second Indochina War as on. Hoi Tran's French unit was moved South, disbanded and reformed as the fledgling South Vietnamese Air Force, of which he was an original member. Tran would go on to train several times in the U.S, to become a fighter pilot. He would see the genesis and death of South Vietnam, from the early days of Ngo Dinh Diem's leadership and assassination to the coups and political instability that followed. With the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Tran beheld American military might flex its muscles, the watershed of the war, the Tet Offensive, and the yellow journalism that followed as well as Vietnamization and on the last day his nation's existence, the "Fall of Saigon." He would observe Ho Chi Minhs' lies and manipulations frustrate and roil Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. Tran's aviation career would transition from a fighter pilot to steering a 727 commercial airplane for Air Viet Nam. However, Tran is one of the lucky ones, as he avoided the cruel and inhumane Communist "Reeducation Camps" or being a "Boat Person," successfully fleeing along with his family to the United States. He attributes his luck to faith, collective karma, and the fact that he was born in 1935, the Asian zodiac sign of "The Boar." The hallmarks of this sign are incredible confidence, perseverance, sincerity and fortuitousness. As this book will testify, Hoi Tran experienced all of this historical tumult and came out smelling like a rose without so much as a scratch. One facet of this book is that Hoi Tran provides a link in filling in all the inaccuracies presented in American Vietnam War literature. Most American soldiers that went to South Vietnam knew nothing about the country, their culture, their government or the intricacies of the war. Here are some examples. Christopher Ronnau, author of "Blood Trails" commented on the Vietnamese Character; "There weren't many structures as we reached the outskirts of Saigon. The sight of a Chase Manhattan bank made me feel nostalgic for a moment. The sight of two ARVN soldiers holding hands as they walked down the street made me stare like a shocked child. The driver laughed and said that guys sometimes held hands over here or sometimes walked along with their arms around each other even if they weren't gay. It made me wonder if VC or NVA soldiers held hands. Maybe they did, but somehow I couldn't picture it." President Nixon promised to end American involvement in Vietnam with honor and a secret plan that later became known as Vietnamization. This was his plan to simply thrust tons of military supplies and money at the South Vietnamese while slowly withdrawing first all land troops, then all air forces and the last to go were naval forces in the South China Sea. How did American Vietnam Veteran authors react to it? Richard Geschke was in South Vietnam in 1971, right at the height of Vietnamization. His anger at being in Vietnam seethed through his description of the war; "If I had to guess as to the percentage of high-market items that ended up with the ARVN, it would be at 95 percent." Rich Geschke continued; "It got to be downright embarrassing when the ARVN became so demanding that they would not take a jeep with a slight crack in the windshield. It became the modus operandi that the ARVN were to be treated on a higher plain. That's when I knew that our so-called allies were nothing but spoiled brats. They had no concept of their mission or how they were to accomplish it! In the scheme of things, we could have given the ARVN the world, but never in one hundred years would they be able to rid themselves of the hostile actions of the North Vietnamese and the VC-no way." John Trotti in "Phantom Over Vietnam wrote: "We were newly embarked on what was euphemistically referred to as the "Vietnamization Program," according to which anything the Vietnamese wanted, and that we were not using at the moment, was to be turned over to them-never mind what they intended to use it for. We were told that because the South Vietnamese had come so far so fast on the road to self determination, they would soon be able to do with nothing from us but a little material help. What was actually going on was that the smart Vietnamese were grabbing and selling everything in sight so they could afford to get out of the country with some cash before we pulled the plug. Many South Vietnamese simply wanted us, our money, and our war machinery out of their country-particularly the civilians in I Corps. It wasn't a matter of politics; they understood all too well that whoever ran the show-be it Saigon, Hue or Hanoi-was going to steal them blind." John Trotti added: "It mattered not what our motives were-whether or not we were committed to self -determination or free elections. To them America meant dismemberment and death, not prosperity and opportunity. They watched us from the fence line in silence. The depths of their baleful stares was the knowledge that in time, American presence would amount to no more than the blood of its soldiers left to fertilize the hills and rice paddies of a people who no longer gave a damn who won." Hoi Tran explains that the South was not allowed to fight its own war. It was their fight. The Americans were there to assist, not bully, dictate and control, which turned out to be the case. The South Vietnamese Air Force was not even allowed to go past the 17th Parallel. The U.S. gave the South Vietnamese Air Force T-28 and A-1H Skyraider W.W. II airplanes while the North Vietnamese received MiG’s. How did the South Vietnamese react to that, knowing the U.S. was way more affluent than either the Soviet Union or Red China? How did the South's political and military leaders, who were mostly schooled in France or the U.S. react to being treated with derision by their American counterparts, especially when they had the same rank? And what about the North's commanders? What level of education did they have? Sorry, you'll have to read this book to find out! Rich Watkins in "Vietnam:No Regrets" wrote; The people were so much smaller than we were, and not to be mean, they were not very good looking either. What struck me most, though, were all the young teenage boys we saw along the way. I thought, If we are here to help these people fight for their freedom from their enemy, and we had come 12,000 miles to do so, then why aren't these guys in uniform fighting for their own country? Rich Watkins also remarked: " We were always looking for "payback"-the more the better. The feelings of the men that actually fought the "Vietnam War" was that the more of the enemy we could kill, the less of them there would be to kill. I know that thinking sounds kind of weird now, but at the same time it made complete sense to us." What Rich Watkins did not understand was the fact that Ho Chi Minh did not care how many of his own men he killed as long as he won. That is why Hoi Tran quoted the Northern leader as saying; They will kill many of us, and we will kill a few of them. They will grow tired of it." Tran also explains that the North constantly sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail fifth column agitators, saboteurs and Communist plants, of which many of the Buddhist rioters in Danang were, as well as the teenagers that Mr. Watkins observed in all likelihood were part of. Richard Geschke added; After the assassination of JFK, Johnson increased the military involvement to the point of staging a false attack of a U.S. Warship in the Gulf of Tonkin. By 1965, the first military units were fully engaged in combat. In January of 1968, the NVA and Viet Cong conducted a coordinated attack on all the major cities of South Vietnam , which is the well-known Tet Offensive. Although the attacks were major disasters to the North Vietnamese, they did in fact put doubt in the public persona of the war as it played out its horrific scenarios each night on TV screens throughout the U.S. Walter Cronkite did a special personal report from the fields of Vietnam, which in essence was questioning our mission and purpose in this faraway land. Criticism escalated, and the antiwar movement was gaining purpose and momentum." In regard to the final disposition of the war, Geschke remarked; LBJ was fully committed to winning "the war at all costs" so much that his poll numbers took a drastic dive and before the 1968 Democratic National Convention he announced with a heavy heart" that he would not seek reelection." That year, 1968, was the key year in the turn of events that would ultimately lead the U.S. to seek a negotiated peace settlement. This effort would take over four years, and to the draftees and officers who were still fully engaged in combat, the negotiations were nothing but talk." When you read Hoi Tran's memoir, pay close attention to his description of the North's methods of negotiating, which will explain quite a bit to the reader. Mr. Tran's label for this is "fight/talk-talk/fight." which unfortunately worked on Henry Kissinger at the Paris Peace Talks. In his memoir, Tran wrote about LBJ's reaction to Cronkite; "The war reporting that had the most devastating impact and eroded America's will drastically was Cronkite's report on the Tet Offensive." Most scholars agree about that point, except one-George Reedy, LBJ's biographer. In his book "Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir" Reedy suggested that LBJ overreacted: "Of all the LBJ weaknesses, perhaps the most important was his inability to understand the press. He was totally baffled by journalists who practiced an art that he regarded as a mystery and he never fully comprehended." Regardless, could American "Vietnamization" have made the difference in the South defeating the North Vietnamese, backed by the Russian/Chinese monolithic bloc? Dick Geschke wrote in regard to that; "Even in the short time that I was in country, I knew that we didn't belong in a place of civil strife about which we Americans should have no say. The concept of the "domino theory" was a misguided theory. Facts are facts: we had an invalid mission statement that would have essentially no bearing whatsoever on the Cold War. At that time, the war was but a concept of saving face. Such a civil war could never be won by an outside party." Family is family; all the North Vietnamese and Vietcong did was wait it out. The negotiations were accomplished, and the U.S. was nothing but an observer. We won in the battlefield, but by 1971, in our hearts, we knew we had lost the war." Family is family? If that is so, why did half a million Northerners leave everything in 1954 to come South? If anyone can see the films that the panic stricken South Vietnamese displayed at Danang when Ed Daly, owner of World Airways landed his commercial plane to rescue women and children from the fast approaching North Vietnamese Army, or on April 29, 1975 at the U.S. Embassy the day before the fall of Saigon, certainly the realization that this is not one happy family would set in. In Jay Mallin's book "Terror in Viet Nam" he informed readers; "Terror is a weapon as real, and sometimes more deadly than a gun. For it can kill not only the body, but the spirit of whose lives it touches with fear. It sets friend against friend, family against family, and even children against parents." Jay Mallin offered this appraisal of North Vietnamese psychological warfare; "To the Communists, terror is not a casual circumstance of war. Rather it is a highly-developed, highly refined political weapon designed to fester unseen from within, soften resistance to the enemy that can be seen, and set the stage for complete collapse of the target against which it is directed. Once in power, the Communists have used it routinely to control its own people." The aforementioned statement is what a lot of people do not understand. Hoi Tran's book will cut through the misconceptions. Pay attention to his descriptions of the panic and desperation that set in just before the fall of Saigon, the circumstances that led families to sell their life savings for a fraction of what it was worth just to take the huge risk of being on a rickety boat crossing the South China Sea, braving weather and pirates to get away from the Communists. Read about the 50,000 South Vietnamese including Hoi Tran's best friend that vanished out at sea, because this was not one happy Vietnamese family. Upon concluding this book, you will understand Hoi's sentiment as to why he felt it was ridiculous for America to expect South Vietnam to be able to effectively replace 550,000 American troops in 1971, a late stage of the war. Finally, when you read Mr. Tran's heartbreaking rendition of the treatment honest citizens were given in the Reeducation Camps, whose only desire was for freedom-and you will realize that what the author said is true; "Sometimes bad things happen to good people." A "must read!"