Public expenditures and environmental protection
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Public expenditures and environmental protection
Gunnar S. EskelandFirst published 20001 editions
Pigou's conjecture was that under costly taxation public expenditures should not reach the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. In the treatment here, public expenditures (and environmental protection) may provide public goods for consumption but also collective inputs for production. When the benefits are in production, the cost of funds is irrelevant. Why? Collective inputs benefit goods that are taxed, while for public goods the shadow price of funds reduces provision as if they were.
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First publish date 20001 credited authorSearch language english
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Gunnar S. Eskeland
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