The author analyses the effect of a legislativ process named "social dialogue" that was invented as part of the Maastricht Treaty's so called "Protocol on social policy" from 1992. The core question is whether the European Social Partners (European Trade Union Congress; UNICE/ Business Europe) are able to improve legislation in the field of European Social Policy compared to efforts undergone by the memberstates themselves. By analysing five empirical cases (comparison of different drafts of legislation e.g. on parental leave, sexual harrasment, part time work) it is shown that the social partners were indeed able to unblock long-lasting legislative projects but did not manage to put EU-wide regulation on social matters on a qualitatively higher basis. This is explained by the employers' organisations strength in the European multi-level system, supporting "neovoluntaristic agreements" (W. Streeck) instead of hard law regulation that normally is prefered by labour organisations.