This book examines what is arguably the most critical and controversial issue of the 1989. Free Trade Agreement signed by the United States and Canada: dispute settlement mechanisms. Debates over this issue have sharpened as the number and intensity of trade disputes have risen due to increasing international competition. More and more groups are calling for the United States to adopt trade policies that will counter the "unfair" practices of foreign governments. Others argue that such policies will jeopardize the success of NAFTA and skew world trade systems. Andrew D.M. Anderson explores this central debate, considering whether the United States will accept international agreements on the mechanisms to settle trade disputes or will resort to the "strong arm" of its political system. His careful and detailed analysis surveys the development of dispute settlement mechanisms, discusses the expectations of the countries that have agreed to them, and evaluates whether the mechanisms are being successfully implemented. Drawing comparisons to the successes and, more important, to the failures of the present GATT accord, Anderson finds that the role of the United States - and its degree of willingness (or unwillingness) to accept the dispute settlement apparatus - has significant ramifications for future, broader agreements on resolving international trade disputes. This book is essential reading for anyone trying to stay current with NAFTA debates, including policymakers, political scientists, economists, and specialists on international trade.