This volume contains essays by a range of distinguished philosophers on the problem of self-deception, or rather, self and deception. The work proceeds from the assumption that changing constructions of self within Western cultures, and alternative notions of self in other cultures requires that we rethink traditional strategies for explaining the phenomenon of self-deception. The concept of self is central to any sustained inquiry into self-deception, the pertinent issue being what sort of self is victim (or beneficiary) of self-deception. Several of the authors here base their thinking on the model of "other-deception," and include discussion of the notions of double selves, multiple selves, and subsystems of the self, to address this troubling problem. Other authors argue that "other-deception" is not an adequate or reliable model to guide our thinking on this issue. The psychological and moral dimensions of self-deception generate a rich discussion, as do its epistemic implications. The concept of emotionality also receives sustained attention.