In this ambitious exploration of how foreign trade policy is made in democratic regimes, Daniel Verdier casts doubt on theories that neglect voters. Bringing the voters back in, Verdier shows that special interests, party ideologues, and state officials and diplomats act as agents of the voters. Constructing a general theory in which existing theories (rent seeking, median voting, state autonomy) function as partial explanations, he shows that trade institutions are not fixed entities but products of political competition. Verdier then offers a thorough analysis of how foreign trade policy was made in France, Britain, and the United States during the period from 1860 through 1990. He discloses a reality startlingly different from previous understandings of American and French trade policies. Challenging the conventional view that special interests have dominated American trade policy, he argues that sectoral economic weight has not been a good predictor of political power in the United States since 1888. Conversely, against the prevailing belief that French industry is controlled by an autonomous state, he reveals the existence of a privileged, collusive relationship between French industry and state officials from the 1892 Meline Tariff through the Socialist victory of 1981. The standard opinion is confirmed only in the case of Britain, where an arm's-length relationship has historically been maintained between industry and government. The book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists, political economists, and historians alike.