Current U.S. Army doctrine emphasizes the importance of extending command emphasis to include not just the close battle but the deep battle. It calls for the use of Deep Fires and maneuver to exploit the deep portion of the battlefield. This report presents an analytic approach that could simulate the development of combat intelligence about the deep battlefield and compare the performance of alternative intelligence systems to support Deep Fires. It emphasizes the development of intelligence products that the Army could use to support the Army tactical missile system in a Central European war in the mid-1990s. It draws on observations of combat intelligence activities during several U.S. and NATO command-post exercises in Germany from 1986 to 1988 and on Army-approved European scenarios and Army combat and intelligence collection models to provide inputs to the simulation of the intelligence system as a whole. The analytic approach presented here employs a set of new techniques for modeling the quality of information in an intelligence system. It uses simple Bayesian logic to develop a high-level view of intelligence processing and realizes it in a flexible, parameterized, rule-based network model.